Heads Up

SAFETY ALERT

WHERE & WHEN: Unit 5 Auxiliary Boiler; 31st May 2017

WHAT HAPPENED?

Modifications to the Unit 5 Auxiliary Boiler Controls Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) code were implemented under two work authorities (WA) on which affected Control Valves were located within an active access permit boundary (AP).

There was a failure to communicate clearly to the Permit Holder and the Control Room Operator the scope of work so that appropriate work controls could be implemented. The events described herein were in violation of Access Permit policy which does not allow use of Work Authority on equipment within an AP boundary.

WHAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED?

It is possible that the control valve and its safety valve could have opened.

If a worker was in the vicinity of control valve, or had been in contact with the valve while it moved, they could have been hurt.

WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THIS EVENT?

This example is to remind workers that all work must conform to the requirements of the Work Authority and Access Permitting system.

- Communication of work scope is a key element of ensuring identification of overlap of work scopes and ensuring adequate controls are in place to ensure that personnel safety is not compromised.
- The AP boundary cannot be violated; regardless of work scope, and AP procedural rules apply.
- Working on control systems has inherent risks to plant operations and the potential for impacting personnel safety.

- Job planning of work scope should include the impacts of other work being done in the same area.

THANKS FOR YOUR COMMITMENT TO A SAFER WORKPLACE